We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells n heterogeneous items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms frequently used in practice. The buy-many property allows the buyer to interact with the mechanism multiple times instead of once as in the more commonly studied buy-one mechanisms. This imposes additional incentive constraints and thus restricts the space of mechanisms that the seller can use.
Introduction
Revenue optimal mechanisms for multi-item settings are notorious within mechanism design for exhibiting strange properties. Even in the simplest possible setting where a seller offers two different items to a single buyer with additive values, the revenue optimal mechanism may offer an infinitely large menu of options, each of which is a lottery or randomized allocation over the items. Furthermore, no "simple" or "nice" families of mechanisms can achieve any finite approximation in revenue to the optimal mechanism, even in this two-item additive setting [12] . In effect, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve simplicity and near optimality for revenue in multi-item settings.
Given this impossibility, in recent work, Chawla et al. [5] advocated studying revenue maximization under the so-called "buy-many" constraint. Informally, a mechanism is buy-many if the buyer is allowed to participate in the mechanism any number of times. For example, a buyer interested in purchasing a subset of items may purchase the components of this subset individually. Viewing the mechanism as a function that assigns prices to allocations, the buy-many constraint is essentially equivalent to a subadditivity constraint over the prices.
Chawla et al. showed that revenue maximization under the buy-many constraint is vastly different from unconstrained revenue maximization. In contrast to the aforementioned impossibility of simple and near optimal mechanisms in the unconstrained setting, the optimal buy-many revenue is always approximated within a factor of O(log n) by item pricing. 1 Here n is the number of items being sold, and item pricing is the mechanism that assigns a price to every item and lets the buyer purchase any subset at the sum of the constituent prices.
The buy-many constraint is a natural property that most real-world mechanisms satisfy. All of the simple classes of mechanisms studied in literature such as item pricings, grand bundle pricing, two part tariffs, etc. also satisfy this property. As such, buy-many mechanisms are a worthy object of study. Chawla et al. asked whether buy-many mechanisms exhibit other structural properties that arbitrary mechanisms do not. In this paper we study two such properties: revenue continuity and menu size complexity. We now discuss these two properties, their significance, and our results in detail.
Revenue Continuity. When sellers invest in improving their products and offerings, they generally expect that consumers will be willing to spend more on the products and revenue will follow suit. Surprisingly, Hart and Reny [11] showed that this is not necessarily the case when the seller has multiple products to sell: it is possible to construct a distribution over valuations, such that when every valuation in the support of the distribution weakly increases, the optimal revenue of the seller strictly decreases. This phenomenon has come to be known as revenue non-monotonicity. The same phenomenon can be exhibited also for buy-many mechanisms. 2 Given this observation, one may ask: by how much can the revenue decrease if valuations change by only a tiny bit. Formally, let D be a distribution over valuations, and let D ′ be another distribution obtained by taking each valuation function in the support of D ′ and changing each component of this function multiplicatively by some factor in [1 − ǫ, 1 + ǫ] for some small ǫ > 0. Can we then show that Rev D ′ ≥ (1 − ǫ ′ )Rev D where ǫ ′ goes to 0 as ǫ goes to 0? We call such a property revenue continuity.
It turns out that the unconstrained optimal revenue does not exhibit revenue continuity. We use an example from Psomas et al. [14] to show that for every ǫ > 0, there exist distributions D and D ′ of unit-demand valuations with D ′ being an "ǫ-perturbation" of D as described above, such that Rev D = ∞ whereas Rev D ′ < ∞.
In sharp contrast to the unconstrained setting, we show that buy-many mechanisms always satisfy revenue continuity, regardless of the distribution D. When the seller has n items to sell, the relative loss in revenue, ǫ ′ , depends polynomially on n and ǫ. On the other hand, we show that a 1 Briest et al. [3] previously showed a similar result for unit-demand buyers. Babaioff et al. [2] showed that there is a revenue gap between unconstrained and buy-many mechanisms even when buyers' values for different items are independently distributed. 2 Indeed, consider any example with bounded additive valuations for which the unconstrained optimal revenue is non-monotone, such as the example in [11] . Add a new item to this example, assigning a high value of H to every buyer type for this additional item, where H exceeds the maximum value that any buyer obtains from any subset of the original items. Then the optimal buy-many revenue for the new setting is exactly H more than the optimal unconstrained revenue of the original setting. In particular, for any mechanism for the original setting, by offering the new item within every possible outcome at a price of H more, the revenue of the mechanism increases by H; This new mechanism is buy-many because any two options cost at least 2H, which is more than the value of the buyer from any allocation. On the other hand, the optimal revenue cannot increase by more than an additive H amount, because given any mechanism for the new setting, we can obtain one for the old setting by replacing any allocation of the new item by its equivalent monetary value. polynomial dependence on n is necessary even when the buyer is unit-demand.
While revenue continuity is inherently interesting, it also has practical implications. Continuity implies that revenue estimates established on the basis of market analysis will be robust to errors in estimating demand. Furthermore, the accuracy of these estimates will improve directly with reduction in measurement error. From an algorithmic standpoint, revenue continuity allows discretizing the values to their most significant digits through a sufficiently fine multiplicative grid. This is possible to do without a significant drop in revenue.
We note that our proposed notion of continuity through multiplicative perturbations differs from other notions proposed in the literature. It is common to consider additive perturbations as done in [15, 1, 6] ; See also Kothari et al. [13] for a more principled exposition of this approach to bound the change in revenue in mechanisms. In addition, other notions of distance like total variation and Prokhorov distance have been considered that are useful when learning distributions through samples. Continuity results based on these distances typically depend on the range of values achieved by consumer valuation functions. In contrast, our notion of multiplicative perturbation is scale invariant and applies to value distributions of arbitrary support. While it is not possible to guarantee such strong continuity properties in the unconstrained setting even for unit-demand valuations, in the buy-many setting we show that it holds for arbitrary distributions over general valuation functions.
Menu Size
Complexity. An additional property we consider is the menu-size complexity of buymany mechanisms. The menu size of a mechanism, defined as the number of different outcomes the seller offers to the buyer, has been studied extensively in literature as a measure of complexity for single-buyer mechanisms (see, e.g., [12, 8, 1, 10] ). It has a direct correspondence with the communication complexity of the interaction protocol between the buyer and the seller.
For unconstrained settings, it is known that even for two items and a buyer who is additive or unit-demand, the menu-size complexity can be infinite [12] . In fact, the same is true for any mechanism that achieves a bounded approximation to the optimal revenue. All known positive results for menu size complexity hold when the valuations are drawn from a product distribution and approximate mechanisms are considered. For the optimal mechanism in the case of an additive buyer and two i.i.d. items, the menu-size complexity of the optimal mechanism is still unbounded [7, 10] .
For buy-many mechanisms, the menu size complexity corresponds to the concept of "additive menu size" introduced by Hart and Nisan [12] , which corresponds to the number of "basic" options a buy-many mechanism offers. We show that while the optimal buy-many mechanism might still have unbounded menu-size complexity, the menu-size required for achieving 1 − ǫ approximation to the optimal revenue is always bounded, even for arbitrary distributions over arbitrary valuations. Indeed, it always suffices to use a menu of size (n/ǫ) 2 O(n) , i.e. doubly exponential in n. When one considers only unit-demand valuations, a menu of size (n/ǫ) O(n) , i.e. singly exponential in n, is sufficient. In both cases, we provide matching lower-bounds showing that any mechanism that achieves o(log n) approximation must have doubly exponential (resp. singly exponential) menu size. In fact we show something even stronger-describing a mechanism that achieves an o(log n) approximation in any possible encoding, requires doubly exponential (resp. singly exponential) number of bits.
Preliminaries
We study the single-buyer optimal mechanism design problem where the seller has n heterogeneous items to sell to a single buyer. The buyer's type is a valuation function v : 2 [n] → R + 0 which specifies a non-negative value for every possible set of items. We assume the buyer's valuation function is always monotone: for any sets of items S ⊆ T ⊆ [n], v(S) ≤ v(T ). We study the Bayesian setting where the buyer's valuation function v is drawn from a known distribution D over valuation functions. The objective of the seller is to maximize the expected revenue.
By the Taxation Principle, any single-buyer mechanism can be described by a menu of possible outcomes, each of which is a lottery that assigns a price to a randomized allocation. Let Λ denote the set of lotteries in the menu. Any lottery λ = (x, p) is specified by a randomized allocation x over sets of items, and a price p charged for the lottery. Denote by x S the probability that set S ∈ [n] is allocated in allocation x, and we have x 1 = 1. We will use x(λ) and p(λ) to denote the allocation and price of lottery λ. The buyer's value from purchasing menu entry λ is defined by v λ ≡ v(λ) ≡ E S∼x v(S). Since the valuation function v can also be expressed as a vector of length 2 n , we also use x · v to denote the buyer's value when getting allocation x. We assume that the buyer has quasi-linear utility, which means the buyer's utility for purchasing lottery λ = (x, p) is
The Buy-one Model. We say that a mechanism M defined by a menu of lotteries Λ is "buyone", if the buyer is allowed to purchase only one menu option from Λ. We assume that the buyer is a utility maximizer that always selects the lottery with the highest utility for his realized valuation function v, arg max λ∈Λ u v (λ).
The Buy-many Model. A buy-many mechanism M generated by a set of lotteries Λ is defined as follows. The buyer can adaptively purchase a (random) sequence of lotteries in Λ, where the buyer can decide which lottery to purchase next after observing the instantiation of the lotteries purchased previously. The buyer gets the union of all items allocated in each step in the sequence of lotteries, and pays the sum of the prices of the lotteries purchased. For any adaptive purchasing algorithm A, let Λ A = (λ A,1 , λ A,2 , · · · ) be the random sequence of lotteries purchased by the buyer. The utility of the buyer under this adaptive strategy is specified by
Any buy-many mechanism can be equivalently described in the form of a buy-one menu. The expected outcome of any adaptive purchasing strategy A can be described as a single lottery consisting of the allocation ∪ i (S i ∼ λ A,i ) and the price E A i p(λ A,i ). The buy-one menu representing the mechanism is simply the collection of all possible such lotteries. Observe that a buyer offered such a menu cannot improve his utility by purchasing more than one menu options. We accordingly say that the buy-one menu satisfies the buy-many constraint. 3 Definition 2.1. A buy-one mechanism M defined by lotteries Λ satisfies the buy-many constraint if for every adaptive buying strategy A there exists a cheaper single lottery λ ∈ Λ dominating it. 4 Revenue. Define Rev D (M) to be the revenue achieved by mechanism M when buyer's type is drawn from D. We also use Rev v (M) to denote the payment of the buyer of type v in mechanism M. Let Opt(D) be the maximum revenue obtained by any truthful mechanism when the buyer's type is drawn from D. Let BuyManyRev(D) be the optimal revenue obtained by any buy-many mechanism for a buyer with type drawn from D.
Menu-size Complexity. The menu-size complexity of a buy-one mechanism M is simply defined to be the number of options on its menu. Likewise, the menu-size complexity of a buy-many mechanism is defined to be the number of options on its menu, although the number of different possible allocations made by the mechanism to buyers with different types can be much more numerous. For example, by this definition the menu-size complexity of item pricings is n. This definition of menu-size complexity for buy-many mechanisms is similar to Hart and Nisan's "additive menu-size complexity", where there are multiple "basic menu entries" and the buyer can choose to purchase any subset of them.
Unit-demand Buyers. Say a buyer is unit-demand over n items, if for any possible instantiation v of the buyer's type and any set S of items, v(S) = max i∈S v({i}). That is, the buyer is interested in purchasing one item, and his value for any set of items is determined by the best item in the set. For unit-demand buyers, any allocation x can be represented as x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) where x i is the probability that item i is getting allocated. Note that sometimes a buyer with general valuation function can be seen as a buyer that is unit-demand over 2 n "meta items", where each meta item corresponds to some subset S ⊆ [n] of items.
Revenue Continuity
In this section, we study the "revenue-continuity" of buy-many mechanisms. We are interested in understanding the extent to which the optimal revenue changes if the value distribution is perturbed slightly. This extent depends, of course, on the manner in which the value distribution is perturbed. It is known [15, 10, 13, 4]), for example, that when each valuation function in the support of the distribution gets perturbed additively by some small ǫ > 0, the optimal revenue does not change too much multiplicatively. However, when the buyer's values are unbounded, it is natural to ask what happens if the valuation function is perturbed multiplicatively. Formally, we consider the following kind of value perturbation.
The following surprising result based on an example by [14] shows that for buy-one mechanisms, perturbing the value distribution multiplicatively may lead to a significant change in revenue. It is even possible that the optimal revenue is infinite before the perturbation, but finite afterward. Since the theorem was not explicitly stated in [14] , we provide a proof in the appendix for completeness. Theorem 3.2. There exists a distribution D over additive value functions over 2 items with Opt(D) = ∞, such that for any ǫ > 0, there exists a distribution D ′ being a (1 ± ǫ)-multiplicative-
The main result of this section is that above discontinuity in revenue for buy-one mechanisms does not happen for buy-many mechanisms. In particular, we have the following theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The high-level proof idea of the theorem is as follows. We find the optimal buy-many mechanism for distribution D and give a discount for every lottery for distribution D ′ . For any v ∼ D, it is possible that when perturbed to v ′ ∼ D ′ , the buyer switches to purchasing a much cheaper lottery. However, we can prove that such value types do not contribute too much to the optimal revenue achieved by buy-many mechanisms.
We first introduce some notation. For any distribution D and A being a set of valuation functions, define D |A to be the following value distribution: a draw from D |A can be simulated by first sampling v ∼ D, then setting v to be zero function if v ∈ A. Let M * be the optimal buy-many mechanism for D represented as a buy-one menu. For value distribution D ′ , construct a mechanism M ′ such that for each option (x, p) ∈ M * , there exists a corresponding lottery (x,
Here ǫ ′ = ǫ 1/6 n 1/2 log 1/6 n is parameterized by ǫ and n. The new mechanism M ′ continues to satisfy the buy-many constraint since we reduce the prices of all menu options uniformly by a factor of 1 − ǫ ′ , and the price of any adaptive strategy also decreases by a factor of 1 − ǫ ′ . Now we argue that
the revenue contributed from buyer of type v in M ′ decreases by a factor at most (1 − ǫ ′ ) 2 , which is close to 1. Thus to show that the optimal revenue of the new distribution does not drop a lot, it suffices to show that the revenue contributed from buyers with type in A is tiny compared to Rev D (M * ). Before value perturbation, suppose that a buyer v ∈ A chooses to purchase (x, p) ∈ M * . Since the buyer is a utility maximizer and prefers not to purchase (
After perturbation, the buyer chooses to purchase (
Since ǫ ′2 ǫ ≫ 1, (3) implies that in M * , the buyer purchases a lottery that has price much smaller than his total value. Intuitively, it's possible to raise the prices to extract more revenue from such buyers in A. We will exploit this fact to show that these buyer types cannot contribute much revenue in M * .
Consider the following item pricing q, which sets price q i = min (x,p)∈M * p Pr[i∈x] for each item i ∈ [n]. Without loss of generality we can reorder the items in [n] and assume that q 1 ≤ q 2 ≤ · · · ≤ q n . The following theorem from [5] shows that there exists a scaled item pricing which obtains a good fraction of the revenue in M * from every buyer v. 
Rev v (M * ). Henceforth, we will focus on a buyer in A with value v, and let p(v) be the price of the menu option bought by this buyer in mechanism M * . Let y i (v) denote the probability over the scaling factor α in the random pricing αq, that buyer purchases a set of items S with i ∈ S being the highest-priced item. Let A j ⊆ A be the following set of buyer types:
2n q j . Consider the following mechanism M j that only sells item j with deterministic price 1 2n q j . For any v ∈ A j , since the buyer can afford to purchase this item in M j , such mechanism can get revenue
On the other hand, for any v ∈ A ′ j , notice that j is the most expensive item purchased by v under random item pricing αq for
Rev
Therefore
Here the first inequality is by (3); the second inequality is by the definition of A ′ j ; the third inequality is by (5) . Consider the following mechanism M ′ j that sells grand bundle {1, 2, · · · , n} with deterministic price ǫ ′2 2ǫ · 2ǫ log 2n nǫ ′2 q j . For any v ∈ A ′ j , by (6) the buyer can afford to purchase the bundle in M ′ j , thus such mechanism can get revenue ǫ ′2 2ǫ · 2ǫ log 2n
From the two cases of A j and A ′ j , by (4) and (7), we have
Thus the revenue contribution from buyer of type v ∈ A is small in M * . Since for v ∈ A, the payment from buyer of type v in M ′ decreases by a factor at most (1 − ǫ ′ ) 2 compared to his payment in M * , thus
by ǫ ′ = ǫ 1/6 n 1/2 log 1/6 n.
We notice that the factor above 1 − O(ǫ 1/6 n 1/2 log 1/6 n) not only depends on ǫ, but also depends on the number of items n. Such polynomial in n dependency is necessary, due to the following theorem. 
Thus under such item pricing, the buyer of type v (k) will purchase item k. Since item pricing satisfies the buy-many constraint, we have
On the other hand, define D ′ , the (1±ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation of D as follows. Each valuation function v (k) is perturbed to value functionṽ (k) , whereṽ
. D ′ is defined as follows: with probability c −k , the buyer has value function v =ṽ (k) , ∀k ∈ [n]; v ≡ 0 otherwise. In D ′ , the buyer always has the same value for each item. For such single-parameter buyer, the optimal mechanism is grand bundle pricing with a deterministic price. Thus the optimal mechanism for D ′ is to post a fixed price 1 ǫ c for all of the items, with optimal revenue being
Menu-size complexity
In this section, we study the menu-size complexity of buy-many mechanisms for revenue maximization. It is known that for buy-one mechanisms, there exists value distribution D even over additive valuation functions over two items such that no mechanism M with finite menu-size complexity can get finite approximation in revenue. In particular, Rev D (M) < ∞, while Opt(D) = ∞. For buymany mechanisms, it's still the case that getting optimal revenue may need a mechanism generated by infinitely many options. We show this by observing that for D being the value distribution of an additive buyer over two items, where the buyer's value for each item is drawn independently from Beta distribution B(1, 2), the optimal buy-one mechanism satisfies the buy-many constraint with infinite menu-size complexity, and no buy-many mechanism with finite menu-size can be optimal. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 4.1. There exists a distribution D over additive valuation functions over two items, such that no mechanism M generated by finitely many menu options can obtain the optimal revenue achieved by buy-many mechanisms.
Suppose that we want a (1 − ǫ)-approximation instead of the exactly optimal revenue. Is the infinite menu-size still needed? This is true for general buy-one mechanisms [3, 12] . But for buy-many mechanisms we show that finite menu-size is enough, even for arbitrary distributions over arbitrary valuation functions. In Section 4.1 we study the problem for a unit-demand buyer. We first prove that a menu-size of (n/ǫ) O(n) is enough for getting a (1 − ǫ)-approximation for a unit-demand buyer. Then we observe that such exponential dependency on n is necessary-there exists a unit-demand value distribution such that no mechanism with a description complexity sub-exponential in n can get a o(log n)-approximation in revenue. In Section 4.2 we show that the above results for a unit-demand buyer can be extended to a general-valued buyer. In particular, we show that for (1 − ǫ)-approximation in revenue, a buy-many mechanism with (n/ǫ) 2 O(n) options suffices; while for o(log n)-approximation in revenue, a mechanism with description complexity doubly-exponential in n is required.
Menu-size Complexity for Unit-demand Buyers
In this section, we study the menu-size complexity for unit-demand buyers. We start with a positive result that finite menu-size is enough for (1−ǫ)-approximation in revenue for buy-many mechanisms. Proof. The proof structure is as follows. First, we show that it is possible to remove all menu entries where the allocation of some items is small. Then we can discretize the allocation probabilities of the remaining menu entries while maintaining the revenue. Such a technique of discretization of allocation probabilities has been used in proving approximation results in menu-size complexity literature such as [13] .
Let M * be the optimal buy-one mechanism satisfying buy-many constraint. The following lemma states that we can ignore all buyers that purchases a menu (x, p) with 0 < x i < δ for some i ∈ [n] and δ = ǫ 3 n 3 , losing only O( √ ǫ) fraction of total revenue. ; for every other x, the lottery is removed from the menu of M ′ . In other words, every lottery with the allocation for each item being not too tiny gets a price discount of factor 1 − √ ǫ in M ′ , while other lotteries are removed. We prove that M ′ satisfies Lemma 4.3.
To show this, we identify a set of buyer types where the value is much more than the corresponding payment of the buyer in M * . Let A be the following set of buyers v: For λ = (x, p) being the menu entry purchased by buyer of type v in M * , i:
Our first observation is that buyer types in this set do not contribute much revenue in the original mechanism. Thus we can ignore the buyers in this set in the later constructions. The proof is deferred to the appendix. Then we prove that for any v ∈ A that buys (x, p) in M * , it will purchase a lottery (x ′ , p ′ ) that is not much cheaper in the new mechanism M ′ . Let x o be the allocation that sets the allocation of all items with x i < δ to 0 in x, and scales every coordinate up uniformly such that 
be the buyer's value contributed from items with small allocation. We also define x H = i:x i ≥λ x i and x L = i:x i <λ x i to be the total allocation for items with large and small allocation respectively. Without loss of generality we can assume x H + x L = 1, since otherwise the buyer can purchase the same lottery (x, p) repeatedly until he gets some item to gain more utility.
Then
In M * , allocation x o can be simulated by repeatedly buying λ = (x, p) until an item with x i > δ appears; and in expectation we need to purchase 1
x H copies. Since M * satisfies the buy-many constraint, we have p o ≤ p x H . Also notice that in M * , the buyer prefers (x, p) to (x ′ , p ′ ), thus
. Thus
Adding the above two inequalities (8) and (9), we get
Now we come back to the proof of Theorem 4.2. By Lemma 4.3, we can first find a mechanism M ′ generated by only menus (x, p) with x i ≥ δ = ǫ 3 n 3 , losing only (1 − O( √ ǫ)) of revenue. Now we construct the following mechanism buy-many M generated by finite number of menus as follows. Let α = √ δ. For any menu (x ′ , p ′ ) in M ′ , there exists a menu (x ′ , (1− α)p ′ ) in M, if x ′ i is a multiple of δ 2 for every item i. In other words, we remove all menu entries in M ′ where the allocation of some item is not a multiple of δ 2 .
Suppose that for some buyer v, it purchases (x ′ , p ′ ) in M ′ , and now purchases (x, p) in M. Since the buyer is utility-maximizer in M ′ , we have
Suppose that x ′′ is the allocation vector that rounds down every dimension of x ′ to the closest multiple of δ 2 . Let p ′′ be the price of allocation x ′′ in M ′ , then p ′′ ≤ p ′ . Since x ′ i ≥ δ or x ′ i = 0 for each i ∈ [n], we have x i ≤ (1 + δ)x ′′ i for the rounded allocation x ′′ . Notice that x ′ can be simulated by purchase a copy of x ′ , then with probability δ purchase another copy of x ′ , finally remove the redundant items. Since in M the buyer prefers to purchase (x, p) rather than purchase (1 + δ) copies of x ′′ and observe that p ′′ ≤ p ′ , we have
Summing up the above two inequalities (10) and (11) we get p ≥ (1 + δ − δ α )p ′ . Take α = √ δ we know that the payment of each buyer in M decreases by a factor of (1 + δ − δ α )(1 − α) ≥ 1 − 2 √ δ compared to his payment in M ′ . Since mechanism M is generated by menus with allocation for each item being a multiple of δ 2 , there are at most 1 + 1 δ 2 possible values for the allocation of each item, thus (1 + 1 δ 2 ) n = O(n 6n ǫ −6n ) possible menu entries in total. Combined with Lemma 4.3, we get a mechanism M generated by at most O(n 6n ǫ −6n ) menu entries with revenue at least The exponential dependency over n in the menu-size is tight, due to the following theorem. The proof of the theorem has the same intrinsic idea of the proof of Theorem 4.4 of [5] , but is simpler and more generalizable.
Theorem 4.5. There exists a distribution D over unit-demand valuation functions over n items, such that BuyManyRev(D) is a factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any mechanism that can be described using o 1 √ n 2 n 1/4 number of bits.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. The proof idea is as follows. Any set of mechanisms that can be described by exponential number of bits contains at most doubly-exponential number of mechanisms. We construct a distribution D over value distributions, such that for any fixed mechanism, the probability that the mechanism can get o(log n)-approximation in revenue is doubly-exponentially small when the value distribution D is drawn from D. Then the theorem is shown by applying union bound.
The way we construct a distribution D over value distributions is as follows. Each distribution D ∼ D is defined by a vector t = (t 1 , · · · , t N ) ∈ [1, poly(n)] N of real numbers and a set of N = 2 n 1/4 item sets B = {S 1 , · · · , S N }: each set has size √ n, and any pairwise intersection of two sets has size ≤ n 1/4 . For each set S i , there is a buyer being unit-demand over S i and has value t i for getting an item. D is constructed by always taking the same set of sets B, and draw each t i ∈ t randomly from a geometric distribution. Throughout the proof, we will call any item set of size √ n a "basic set". We first construct a set of N = 2 n 1/4 basic sets, such that the pairwise intersection is small. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 4.6. There exists a collection B of N = 2 n 1/4 sets of size √ n, such that any two different sets S, S ′ ∈ B, |S ∩ S ′ | ≤ n 1/4 . Let B = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S N } be the sets constructed by Lemma 4.6. For any set S i ∈ B and t ∈ R, let v S i ,t denote the following unit-demand valuation function: for any set of items
That is, the buyer has value t for accepting any item in S i . Define H = 1 3 n 1/4 . For any t = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t N ) ∈ [1, H] N being a value vector of length N , define value distribution D B,t to be a uniform distribution over value functions
Consider the following mechanism M D B,t : for each v i = v S i ,t i , there is a corresponding menu entry (x i , p i ) ∈ M D B,t , where x i allocates each item in S i with probability 1 √ n , and p i = 1 2 t i . On one hand, each buyer of type v i can afford to purchase lottery (x i , p i ) with utility t i 2 . On the other hand, a buyer of type v i purchasing another lottery (x j , p j ) will let him get an item in S i with probability 1 n 1/4 , since |S i ∩ S j | ≤ n 1/4 . Thus his utility of purchasing (x j , p j ) is at most 1
Notice that for buyer of type v i , the utility of purchasing any collection of menus is subadditive over the lotteries, since the buyer's valuation function is subadditive. Thus for any adaptive strategy that purchases α j copies of lottery (x j , p j ) in expectation, ∀j ∈ [ℓ], the utility of buyer v i is at most the sum of his utility on purchasing α j copies of lottery (x j , p j ) for each j. Since his utility for purchasing any lottery other than (x j , p j ) is negative, no adaptive strategy purchasing lottery other than (x i , p i ) can be optimal. Therefore, the optimal strategy for any buyer of type v i is to purchase one copy of lottery (
Let Q be arbitrary class of mechanisms with |Q| ≤ 2 N/H 2 , and set c = 1 12 log H. It suffices to show that there exists a value vector t, Rev D B,t (M) < 1 c BuyManyRev(D B,t ), for every M ∈ Q. Suppose that we generate a random t = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t N ) ∈ [1, H], where each t i is independently drawn from the following truncated geometric distribution: Pr[t i = 2 a ] = 2 −a 1−H −1 for 1 ≤ a ≤ log H. Fix a mechanism M ∈ Q. We study the probability that Rev D B,t (M) ≥ 1 c BuyManyRev(D B,t ), over the randomness of t.
For the fixed mechanism M ∈ Q, define h i to be the payment of a buyer with type v S i ,t i in mechanism M. Thus, to bound the probability that Rev D B,t (M) < 1 c BuyManyRev(D B,t ), we only need to bound the probability that Pr
For any set S i ∈ B, define value distribution D i as follows. A draw v ∼ D i can be simulated by first draw t i according to the truncated geometric distribution: Pr[t i = 2 a ] = 2 −a 1−H −1 for 1 ≤ a ≤ log H; then return value function v = v S i ,t i . In other words, for buyer type v ∼ D i , v is always demanding the same set of items, but the value is drawn from some equal-revenue distribution. Notice that selling any lottery to this buyer is equivalent to sell fractional amounts of items in S i to a single-parameter buyer. The optimal revenue from this single-parameter buyer from any mechanism, over the randomness of t i , can be achieved by a pricing the grand bundle of all items at a deterministic price. Such optimum is obtained by selling the grand bundle at price H, and the optimal revenue is 1 1−H −1 < 2. Thus h i is a random variable with expectation
On the other hand,
Here the first line is by union bound. The second line is by Et i = log H 1−H −1 . The third line is by Hoeffding's inequality and observe that 0 ≤ h i , t i ≤ H. The last line is by c = 1 12 log H. Then by union bound, since there are only 2 N/H 2 mechanisms in Q, there exists t such that no mechanism in Q can get revenue at least 1 c BuyManyRev(D B,t ). This proves Theorem 4.5 since c = 1 12 log H = Ω(log n), and any mechanism set of size > 2 N/H 2 cannot be described by less than N H 2 = 9 √ n 2 n 1/4 bits.
Menu-size Complexity for General-valued Buyers
We know that a buyer with general value distribution can be seen as unit-demand over 2 n possible sets. The proof of Theorem 4.2 completely goes through when the buyer is unit-demand over 2 n sets instead of unit-demand over n items, thus we have the following theorem. While the theorem is not a direct corollary of Theorem 4.2, the proof is almost identical to the unit-demand case, thus we skip the proof of the theorem. The menu-size we get for (1 − ǫ) approximation in revenue is doubly-exponential in n. We can show that such doubly-exponential menu-size dependency on n is the best possible for (1 − ǫ)approximation in revenue. We show that getting o(log n)-approximation in revenue may require a mechanism with description complexity that is doubly-exponential in n, even when the buyer has XOS valuation functions. This improves the lower bound in [5] exponentially for general-valued buyer.
Theorem 4.8. There exists a distribution D over XOS valuation functions over n items, such that BuyManyRev(D) is a factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any mechanism that can be described using o 1 √ n 2 2 n 1/4 /4 number of bits.
The proof idea is as follows. Similar to the proof for unit-demand case, we notice that the number of mechanisms that can be described by doubly-exponential number of bits is at most triplyexponential in n. We construct a distribution D over distributions of XOS value functions, such that for any fixed mechanism, the probability that the mechanism can get o(log n)-approximation in revenue is triply-exponentially small when the value distribution D is drawn from D.
The XOS value functions we consider for the buyer are of the form v(S) ∝ max i |S i ∩ S|, for a collection of sets S i that have large size |S i | = √ n but small pairwise intersections |S i ∩ S j | ≤ n 1/4 .
These valuation functions can be thought of as (approximately) unit-demand over the exponentiallymany bundles of items S i . Based on this observation, we adapt the lower-bound proof for unitdemand buyers to general-value functions that are approximately unit-demand over bundles of items. This allows us to strengthen the lower-bound from exponential to doubly-exponential. See the appendix for the complete proof.
[ Proof of Theorem 3.2. We will use the following three theorems from previous literature. The first two theorems show that there exists a distribution D over additive value functions, such that for
n=1 be a sequence in [0, 1] 2 such that gap n := min 1≤j<n (g n − g j ) · g n > 0
for all n ≥ 1. Then there exists a sequence (t n ) ∞ n=1 of positive real number and a buyer's value distribution D such that 1. For any v ∼ D, there exists integer n such that v = t n g n ;
Opt(D)
Brev(D) > 1 2 ∞ n=1 gap n gn 1 , and Brev(D) < ∞.
Theorem A.2. (Slightly stronger version of Proposition 7.5 of [12] ) There exists an infinite sequence of points (g n ) ∞ n=1 in [0, 1] 2 with g n 2 ≤ 1 such that gap n = Ω(n −6/7 ). Furthermore, for any g n = (g n,1 , g n,2 ) in the sequence, 1 2 g n,1 ≤ g n,2 ≤ 2g n,1 . The theorem is slightly stronger than Proposition 7.5 of [12] , by adding the constraint 1 2 g n,1 ≤ g n,2 ≤ 2g n,1 . This can be proved by modifying the original proof of Proposition 7.5 of [12] as follows. In the original proof, [12] shows that the sequence of points (g n ) composed of a sequence of "shells", each containing multiple points, satisfy gap n = Ω(n −6/7 ). All points g n in the N -th shell are of length g n 2 = ℓ≤N ℓ −3/2 / ℓ<∞ ℓ −3/2 , and each shell N contains N 3/4 different points in it with the angle between any two of them being at least Ω(N −3/4 ). [12] did not specify how to choose these points in each shell, but we notice that it's possible to restrict all points g n = (g n,1 , g n,2 ) chosen to satisfy 1 2 g n,1 ≤ g n,2 ≤ 2g n,1 , and still make the angle between any two points in a shell being Ω(N −3/4 ). This proves Theorem A.2.
The following theorem from [14] shows that for any value distribution, if each possible value shifts uniformly by a small square of length δ, the optimal revenue is always upper bounded by O( 1 δ 2 Brev). 
Then Rev(D ′ ) ≤ π δ 2 Brev(D ′ ). Apply Theorem A.3 to a distribution D over additive value functions, such that for any v = (v 1 , v 2 ) ∼ D, 1 2 v 1 ≤ v 2 ≤ 2v 1 , and Opt(D) = ∞. The square-shift with δ = 2ǫ under the assumption that for any v = (v 1 , v 2 ) ∼ D, 1 2 v 1 ≤ v 2 ≤ 2v 1 can be captured by (1±ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation. Thus for any ǫ > 0, there exists a distribution D ′ being a (1 ± ǫ)-multiplicative-perturbation of D with Opt(D) < ∞.
Theorem 4.1. There exists a distribution D over additive valuation functions over 2 items, such that no mechanism M generated by finitely many menus can get optimal revenue achieved by buymany mechanisms.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let D be the value distribution of an additive buyer over 2 items, where the buyer's value for each item is drawn independently from Beta distribution B (1, 2) . That is, the buyer's value v i for each item i ∈ {1, 2} is drawn from [0, 1] with density f (v i ) = 2−2v i . In previous literature Daskalakis et al. [7] characterized the unique optimal mechanism for this setting with infinite menu-size as follows. Define x 0 = y 0 ≈ 0.0618 and p * ≈ 0.5535 be constants calculated in [7] . The value space [0, 1] 2 is divided into 4 regions:
For buyer type in each region, the allocation and payment in the optimal mechanism M * are defined as follows.
• If (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ Z, the buyer gets no items and pays 0.
• If (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ A, the buyer gets item 1 with probability 2 (4−5v 1 ) 2 , item 2 with probability 1, and pays • If (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ B, the buyer gets item 2 with probability 2 (4−5v 2 ) 2 , item 1 with probability 1, and pays
• If (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ W, the buyer gets both item 1 and item 2, and pays p * ≈ 0.5535.
The following lemma shows that the optimal buy-one mechanism stated above satisfies the buymany constraint.
Lemma A.4. The optimal buy-one mechanism M * for distribution D satisfies the buy-many constraint.
Proof of Lemma A.4. We argue that given the menu in M * , the optimal adaptive strategy for buyer of any type is to purchase a single lottery: his corresponding lottery in the buy-one mechanism M * . For any buyer with value (v 1 , v 2 ), if his optimal adaptive strategy only purchases one lottery, then the lottery must be his allocation in M * . Otherwise, since any lottery in M * allocates one of the two items deterministically, without loss of generality in his optimal adaptive strategy we assume the buyer first purchases a lottery (x, p) with x = (1, a) for some a ∈ [0, 1) that allocates item 1 surely. If he did not get both items, then purchase lottery (x ′ , p ′ ) with x ′ = (0, 1). Such adaptive strategy is the only possible optimal strategy that does not purchase a single lottery. In such adaptive strategy, the buyer always gets both items, with expected payment p + (1 − a)p ′ . Notice that in M * , a < Thus Rev D |A i (M * ) ≤ 1 n ǫRev D (M * ), and
Lemma 4.6. There exists a collection B of N = 2 n 1/4 sets of size √ n, such that any two different sets S, S ′ ∈ B, |S ∩ S ′ | ≤ n 1/4 . Proof of Lemma 4.6. For any S of size √ n, let N y be the number of item sets S ′ of size √ n such that |S ∩ S ′ | = y, ∀x ≤ n 1/4 . Since such a set S ′ can be determined by first choose y items in S, then choose n 1/2 − y items out of S, thus N y = n 1/2 y n−n 1/2 n 1/2 −y . Notice that N y = N y+1 · (n−2n 1/2 +y+1)(y+1) (n 1/2 −y) 2 ≥ N y+1 · (y + 1) for y ≥ 1. Thus for a random set S ′ of size √ n, the probability that |S ′ ∩ S| > n 1/4 is
Then if we randomly select N = 2 n 1/4 sets of size √ n, by union bound, the probability that there exists two sets with intersection size > n 1/4 is at most N 2 n 1/4 ! < 1 for large enough n. Thus, there exists a collections of N sets of size √ n such that the size of pairwise intersection is at most n 1/4 . Theorem 4.8. There exists a distribution D over XOS valuation functions over n items, such that BuyManyRev(D) is a factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any mechanism that can be described using o 1 √ n 2 2 n 1/4 /4 number of bits.
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Let's start with some notations used in this proof. Define N = 2 n 1/4 , H = 1 3 n 1/4 , m = √ N , ℓ = 2 N 1/4 . Throughout the proof, we will call any item set of size √ n a "basic set", and any collection of m = √ N basic sets a "basic collection". We first construct a set B of N = 2 n 1/4 basic sets through Lemma 4.6, such that the pairwise intersection is small. Apply the above lemma to the collection of basic sets B constructed in Lemma 4.6, we can also construct a set of ℓ = 2 N 1/4 basic collections C, such that for any two different basic collections C i , C j ∈ C, |C i ∩ C j | ≤ N 1/4 . For any basic collection C ∈ C and t ∈ R, let v C,t denote the following XOS valuation function: for any set of items S ⊆ [n], v C,t (S) = t √ n max S ′ ∈C |S ∩ S ′ |. In other words, such buyer has value t if he is able to get one of the sets in C, and the value decreases linearly with respect to the maximum portion he could get from any set in C.
For any t = (t 1 , · · · , t ℓ ) ∈ R ℓ being a value vector of length ℓ, and C = (C 1 , · · · , C ℓ ) being the basic collections we constructed above, define value distribution D C,t to be the uniform distribution over valuation functions (v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v ℓ ) = (v C 1 ,t 1 , v C 2 ,t 2 , · · · , v C ℓ ,t ℓ ). Consider the following mechanism M D C,t for value distribution D C,t . For each v i = v C i ,t i , there is a corresponding menu entry (x i , p i ) ∈ M D C,t , where x i allocates to the buyer each set of items S ∈ C i with probability 1 m ; the price of such allocation x i is p i = t i 2 . On one hand, each buyer of type v i can afford to purchase (x i , p i ) with utility t i 2 . On the other hand, purchasing other lottery (x j , p j ) will let buyer v i get an set S ′ in C i with probability at most 1 N 1/4 since |C i ∩ C j | ≤ N 1/4 , and in this case his value is t i ; otherwise the buyer gets a set S ′ not in C i , then since |S ∩ S ′ | ≤ n 1/4 , the value he gets is at most 1 n 1/4 t i . Thus the utility of purchasing any other lottery (x j , p j ) is at most 1 N 1/4 · t i + 1 − 1 N 1/4 · 1 n 1/4 t i − p j < 0 since p j = t j 2 ≥ 1 2 , and t i ≤ H = 1 3 n 1/4 . Notice that for buyer with type v i , the utility of purchasing any collection of menus is subadditive over the lotteries, since the buyer's valuation function is subadditive. Thus for any adaptive strategy that purchases α j copies of lottery (x j , p j ) in expectation, ∀j ∈ [ℓ], the utility of buyer v i is at most the sum of his utility on purchasing α j copies of lottery (x j , p j ) for each j. Since his utility for purchasing any other lottery is negative, thus no adaptive strategy purchasing lottery other than (x i , p i ) can be optimal. Therefore, the optimal strategy for any buyer of type v i is to purchase one copy of lottery (x i , p i ). Then BuyManyRev(D C,t ) = 1 2ℓ ℓ i=1 t i . The rest of the proof follows the same flow as the singly-exponential description complexity lower bound proof for a unit-demand buyer. Let Q be arbitrary class of mechanisms with |Q| ≤ 2 ℓ/H 2 , and set c = 1 12 log H. It suffices to show that there exists a value vector t, Rev D C,t (M) < 1 c BuyManyRev(D C,t ), for every M ∈ Q.
Suppose that we generate a random t = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t ℓ ) ∈ [1, H], where each t i is independently drawn from the following truncated geometric distribution: Pr[t i = 2 a ] = 2 −a 1−H −1 for 1 ≤ a ≤ log H. Fix a mechanism M ∈ Q. We study the probability that Rev D C,t (M) ≥ 1 c BuyManyRev(D C,t ), over the randomness of t.
For the fixed mechanism M ∈ Q, define h i to be the payment of a buyer with type v C i ,t i in mechanism M. Thus, to bound the probability that Rev D C,t (M) < 1 c BuyManyRev(D C,t ), we only need to bound the probability that Pr t [ 1
For any basic collection C i , define value distribution D i as follows. A draw v ∼ D i can be simulated by first draw t i according to the truncated geometric distribution: Pr[t i = 2 a ] = 2 −a 1−H −1 for 1 ≤ a ≤ log H; then return value function v = v C i ,t i . In other words, for buyer type v ∼ D i , v is always demanding the same sets, but the value is drawn from some equal-revenue distribution. Notice that selling any lottery to this buyer is equivalent to sell fractional amounts of sets in C i to a single-parameter buyer. The optimal revenue from this single-parameter buyer from any mechanism, over the randomness of t i , can be achieved by a pricing the grand bundle of all items at a deterministic price. Such optimum is obtained by selling the grand bundle at price H, and the optimal revenue is 1 1−H −1 < 2. Thus h i is a random variable with expectation
On the other hand, Et i = log H 1−H −1 . Thus Pr
